Research | Tijn Smits

Research Interests

My primary interests span the field of ethics, from applied to meta-ethics. Often, I am interested in connecting these questions to other subfields of philosophy, like political philosophy or epistemology.

I typically work within a Kantian framework. Not dogmatically so, but because it provides an opening for systematically connecting topics across philosophy, and because I believe Kantianism, with strong foundations, has important contributions to make to both emerging and timeless questions in ethics.

Please reach out for paper drafts or presentation handouts.

Moral Epistemology

My research in moral epistemology is centred around the interpretation of Kant. In my dissertation, I aim to define the nature and conditions of 'practical cognition' in relation to notions such as belief, knowledge, and science, as well as their theoretical counterparts. This will give us a better understanding of what it means to assent to a moral judgment, on Kant's account, and how such a judgment compares to a descriptive one.

In progress:

A paper on Kant’s understanding of practical cognition of moral imperatives.
A paper on Kant’s understanding of the kind of cognition we have of freedom of the will.
A paper on whether we have knowledge, in the Kantian sense, of the moral law.
A paper on the conditions for ethics to be a proper science.
A paper on the quasi-mathematical method of construction employed in the Doctrine of Right.

Climate Ethics

My work in climate ethics is based on the belief that deontological constraints are uniquely capable of providing reasons and obligations for acting in collective action problems, especially the most urgent one for our times, global warming.

Published:

"A Kantian Justification of Fair Shares: On Climate Ethics and Imperfect Duties". Ethics Policy, and Environment.
"A Kantian Response to the Inefficacy Challenge: Why Helping in Collective Impact Problems is Required". Forthcoming.

Ethics of Belief

The ethics of belief is a novel field inquiring into the norms governing belief-formation. I am particularly interested in when and how practical, especially moral, reasons can override or fill the void of epistemic reasons for holding (or not holding) a belief.

In progress:

A paper on whether the formula of humanity recognizes the possibility of 'doxastic wronging'.
A paper on how conspiracy theories manifest a self-deceived respect for truth.